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and relationship-specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts. The extent of
international outsourcing depends inter alia on the thickness of the domestic and foreign market for input
suppliers, the relative cost of searching in each market, the relative cost of customizing inputs, and the
nature of the contracting environment in each country.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
We live in an age of outsourcing. Firms seem to be subcontracting an ever expanding
set of activities, ranging from product design to assembly, from research and develop-
ment to marketing, distribution, and after-sales service. Some ﬁrms have gone so far
as to become “virtual” manufacturers, owning designs for many products but making
almost nothing themselves.1
Vertical disintegration is especially evident in international trade. A recent annual
report of the World Trade Organization (1998) details, for example, the production
of a particular “American” car:
Thirty percent of the car’s value goes to Korea for assembly, 17.5 per-
cent to Japan for components and advanced technology, 7.5 percent to
Germany for design, 4 percent to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts,
2.5 percent to he United Kingdom for advertising and marketing services,
and 1.5 percent to Ireland and Barbados for data processing. This means
that only 37 percent of the production value ... is generated in the United
States. (p.36)
Feenstra (1998), citing Tempest (1996), describes similarly the production of a Barbie
doll. According to Feenstra, Mattel procures raw materials (plastic and hair) from
Taiwan and Japan, conducts assembly in Indonesia and Malaysia, buys the molds in
the United States, the doll clothing in China, and the paints used in decorating the
dolls in the United States. Indeed, when many observers use the term “globalization,”
they have in mind a manufacturing process similar to what Feenstra and the WTO
have described.
1See The Economist (1991) for an overview of trends toward greater outsourcing in manufactur-
ing. Helper (1991), Gardner (1991), Bardi and Tracey (1991), Bamford (1994) and Abraham and
Taylor (1996) document increased subcontracting in particular industries or for particular activities.
1To us, outsourcing means more than just the purchase of raw materials and stan-
dardized intermediate goods. It means ﬁnding a partner with which a ﬁrm can es-
tablish a bilateral relationship and having the partner undertake relationship-speciﬁc
investments so that it becomes able to produce goods or services that ﬁtt h eﬁrm’s
particular needs. Often, but not always, the bilateral relationship is governed by a
contract, but even in those cases the legal document does not ensure that the partners
will conduct the promised activities with the same care that the ﬁrm would use itself
if it were to perform the tasks.2
Because outsourcing involves more than just the purchase of a particular type of
good or service, it has been diﬃcult to measure the growth in international outsourc-
ing. Audet (1996), Campa and Goldberg (1997), Hummels et al. (2001) and Yeats
(2001) have used trade in intermediate inputs or in parts and components to proxy
for what they have variously termed ‘vertical specialization’, ‘intra-product special-
ization’ and ‘global production sharing’. While these are all imperfect measures of
outsourcing as we would deﬁne it, the authors do show that there has been rapid
expansion in international specialization for a varied group of industries that includes
textiles, apparel, footwear, industrial machinery, electrical equipment, transportation
equipment, and chemicals and allied products. It seems safe to tentatively conclude
that the outsourcing of intermediate goods and business services is one of the most
rapidly growing components of international trade.
In this paper, we develop a framework that can be used to study ﬁrms’ decisions
about where to outsource. We consider a general equilibrium model of production
and trade in which ﬁrms in one industry must outsource a particular activity. These
ﬁrms can seek partners in the technologically and legally advanced North, or they
can look in the low-wage South. Our model of a ﬁrm’s decision incorporates what we
consider to be the three essential features of a modern outsourcing strategy. First,
ﬁrms must search for partners with the expertise that allows them to perform the
2Marsh (2001, p.10) notes some of the pitfalls in outsourcing: “Outsourcers depend on others
caring as much about the product as they do. If you ask someone else to make a vital component,
you may lose control over the way it evolves.”
2particular activities that are required. Second, they must convince the potential sup-
pliers to customize products for their own speciﬁc needs. Finally, they must induce
the necessary relationship-speciﬁc investments in an environment with incomplete
contracting.
Using the framework developed in Sections 2 and 3, we are able to examine in
Sections 4 and 5 several possible determinants of the location of outsourcing. First,
the size of a country can aﬀect the ‘thickness’ of its markets. All else equal, a ﬁrm
prefers to search in a thicker market, because it is more likely to be able to ﬁnd
a partner there with the appropriate skills that would make it able and willing to
tailor a component or service for the ﬁnal producer’s needs. Second, the technology
for search aﬀects the cost and likelihood of ﬁnding a suitable partner. Search will
be less costly and more likely successful in a country with good infrastructure for
communication and transportation. Third, the technology for specializing compo-
nents determines the willingness of a partner to undertake the needed investment
in a prototype. Finally, diﬀerences in contracting environments can impinge on a
ﬁrm’s ability to induce a partner to invest in the relationship. We study the con-
tracting environment by introducing a parameter that represents the extent to which
relationship-speciﬁc investments are veriﬁable by an outside party.
While our model is rich in its description of the outsourcing relationship, it is
limited by its focus on activities for which ﬁrms have no choice but to outsource.
Elsewhere (see Grossman and Helpman, 2002) we have studied a ﬁrm’s decision of
whether to undertake an activity in-house or to outsource it. There, like here, we
cast individual ﬁrms’ choices in the context of an industry and general equilibrium.
But we focus narrowly on a closed rather than a global economy. The next step in
our progression would be a model in which ﬁrms have a four-way choice of whether
to undertake an activity either in-house or by subcontract, and either at home or
abroad. Such a model would come closer to describing the central decisions facing
modern, multinational ﬁrms. But the current paper takes an important intermediate
step, because it highlights the considerations that are bound to be important in a
more complete analysis.
32T h e M o d e l
Consider a world with two countries, North and South, and two industries. Firms in
either country can produce a homogeneous consumer good z with one unit of local
labor per unit of output. Firms in the North also can design and assemble varieties of
ad i ﬀerentiated consumer good y. The South lacks the know-how needed to perform
these activities. Both countries are able to produce intermediate goods (business
services or components), which are vital inputs into the production of good y.
The varieties of good y are diﬀerentiated in two respects. First, as is usual in
models of intra-industry trade, consumers regard the diﬀerent products as imperfect
substitutes. Second, the varieties require diﬀerent components in their production.
We capture product diﬀerentiation in the eyes of consumers with the now-familiar
formulation of a CES sub-utility function. On the supply side, we associate each ﬁnal
good with a point on the circumference of a unit circle, so that the “location” of a
good represents the speciﬁcations of the input needed for its assembly.












, 0 < α,β < 1.( 1 )
where z is consumption of the homogeneous ﬁnal good and y(j,l) is consumption
of the jth variety located at point l on the unit circle (relative to some arbitrary
zero point). We shall assume that there is a continuum of goods located at each
point on the circle, but (1) implies that consumers regard the various goods at the
same location on the circle as diﬀerentiated. In the limit to the integral, ˆ n(l) is the
measure of varieties available to consumers that require an intermediate input with
characteristics l. Note that, as usual, β gives the spending share that consumers
optimally devote to the homogeneous good, and ε =1 /(1 − α) is the elasticity of
substitution between any pair of varieties of good y.
T h ep r o d u c t i o np r o c e s si sa sf o l l o w s .F i r s t ,ﬁrms in the North enter as potential
producers of a variety of good y. Entry requires an investment of wNfn in product
4design, where wN is the Northern wage rate and fn is the amount of labor needed
to develop a diﬀerentiated product.3 The production of a diﬀerentiated product
requires one unit of a customized intermediate input per unit of output. The ﬁnal-
good producers cannot manufacture these inputs themselves (or, it is prohibitively
costly for them to do so due to their relatively small scale of production). Rather,
they must outsource this activity to a specialized producer of components in one
country or the other. If a ﬁnal producer is successful in ﬁnding a suitable partner
and in convincing this ﬁrm to tailor an intermediate good for its use, it needs no
additional inputs to assemble the ﬁnal output.4 T h el o c a t i o no nt h ec i r c l eo faﬁrm’s
requisite component is a random element in its product design, and all locations are
equally likely.
A tt h es a m et i m et h a tﬁrms in the North enter as potential ﬁnal producers, ﬁrms in
either country may enter as suppliers of intermediate products. Such entry involves
an investment in expertise (and, perhaps, equipment). A supplier’s expertise is
represented by a point on the unit circle. The investment in developing expertise is
large relative to the cost of designing a single ﬁnal product, so there are relatively few
(i.e., a ﬁnite number) of suppliers of components in any country, each of which serves
many ﬁnal producers. The cost of entry by a component producer in country i is
wifi
m,w h e r ewi is the wage in country i for i = S,N,a n dfi
m is the labor requirement
there.
Figure 1 shows the location of the intermediate producers in one of the coun-
tries. For ease of visualization, we have depicted a market with only eight suppliers,
although for reasons that will become clear, we have in mind equilibria with larger
numbers than this. We neglect the integer “problem,” and treat the ﬁnite number
of input suppliers in country i, mi, as a continuous variable. In equilibrium, the
suppliers in any market will be equally spaced around the circle.
3Since there is a continuum of diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods, the ﬁxed cost of designing a single
product is inﬁnitesimally small. Of course, the total resources used in designing a positive measure
of such goods is ﬁnite.
4This is an inessential simpliﬁcation. We could as well assume that production of ﬁnal goods

















Figure 1: Locations of input suppliers
Once entry has occurred, the next stage involves search. Northern ﬁrms that
have developed designs for ﬁnal products must locate suppliers for their components.
Each ﬁrm must choose the market in which it will seek a supplier, because search in
one geographic region is a distinct activity from search in the other. For reasons that
will become clear, a ﬁrm’s goal in its search is to ﬁnd a partner whose expertise (as
represented by its location on the circle) is close to the ﬁrm’s own input requirement.
Final producers are assumed to know how many suppliers are active in each coun-
try (the “thickness” of the market) but not the precise locations of these producers
in terms of their expertise. The ﬁrms know that the suppliers in a market are equally
spaced around the circle, and regard all equi-spaced conﬁgurations as equally likely.
Each ﬁrm chooses the intensity of its search in the market of its choice, with search
costs rising quadratically in the extent of search. We assume that search must be
carried out by Northern labor. A search of intensity x in market i requires ηix2 units
of labor, and thus costs wNηix2. Such a search will turn up all suppliers in an arc of
length 2x. Since each ﬁrm seeks a supplier with expertise appropriate to its needs, it
searches symmetrically about its own location in input space. In Figure 1 we show
two ﬁrms, at h and k, that conduct searches of equal intensity x, as represented by the
6indicated arcs. In this case, the ﬁrm at location k is successful in ﬁnding a potential
supplier (input producer 7), but the ﬁrm at location h fails in its search eﬀort. A
ﬁrm that fails to locate a supplier of components is unable to produce ﬁnal output
and thus forfeits its initial investment.
A successful search results in a bilateral match. This leads to a negotiation and
possibly to a relationship-speciﬁc investment by the input supplier. We postpone
discussion of the bargaining and contracting issues for a moment, to focus on the
technological considerations. In order to produce the customized inputs needed by
ap a r t i c u l a rﬁnal producer, a supplier must invest in a prototype. The greater
is the distance between the supplier’s expertise and the ﬁnal producer’s needs, the
larger is the cost of customization. In particular, if a supplier in country i wishes to
provide components to a ﬁnal producer whose location is at a distance x from its own
expertise, then it must pay a ﬁxed cost of wiµix to develop the prototype. Thereafter,
it can produce customized components for its partner at constant marginal cost, with
one unit of local labor needed per unit of output.
2.1 Bargaining and Contracting
Bargaining occurs in two stages. When a ﬁnal producer locates a potential supplier
in a given market, the two ﬁrms ﬁrst negotiate over the extent of the supplier’s in-
vestment in customization and the amount of compensation for the prototype. Later,
they negotiate over the quantity and price of an input order. The size of the order
and the payment cannot be negotiated ahead of time, because then the input supplier
might make no investment in customization but still produce inputs and demand to
be paid.5
5Alternatively, we might allow the two sides to negotiate a price of inputs when they ﬁrst meet
while giving the ﬁnal producer the option to decide the size of its order after it inspects the prototype.
Such a contract typically would be renegotiated ex post, but it would alter the disagreement point for
the second-stage negotiation and thus could be used to induce investment by the supplier. We have
investigated such contracts and ﬁnd that they can stimulate investment that would not otherwise be
made if and only if α > 1/2 (i.e., ε > 2). But even in cases where an initial negotiation of price with
an option to buy can mitigate the hold-up problem, it can never induce the same investment choices
7We shall refer to the contract that governs the supplier’s investment in the pro-
totype as the investment contract and that which governs the exchange of inputs as
the order contract. Note that the prototype is valuable only inside the relationship.6
Also, while the supplier’s investment (or its result) can be perfectly observed by the
ﬁnal producer, we assume that it is only partly veriﬁable to outside parties. As is
familiar from the work of Williamson (1985), Hart and Moore (1990), and others, the
imperfect veriﬁability of investment constrains the contracting possibilities. Thus,
the investment contract is an incomplete contract. In contrast, the order contract is
a complete contract, because both quantity and price are veriﬁable.
We wish to allow for diﬀerent contracting environments in the two countries,
inasmuch as this may be an important consideration in a ﬁrm’s choice of where to
outsource. To this end, we extend the existing literature on imperfect contracts to
incorporate intermediate cases between the familiar extremes of “no contracts” and
“perfect contracts.” We assume that, in country i, an outside party can verify a
fraction γi < 1/2 of the investment in customization undertaken by an input sup-
plier for a potential downstream customer. The parameter γi may be given a literal
interpretation: the development of the prototype requires a number of stages or sub-
investments, some of which are veriﬁable and others are not. More ﬁguratively, we
imagine that γi captures the quality of the legal system in country i;t h eg r e a t e ri s
γi, the more complete are the contracts that can be written there.
2.1.1 The Investment Contract
Now consider the negotiation of an investment contract between an input producer in
country i and a downstream ﬁrm whose required component is at a distance x from
as would result if customization were fully contractible. Since the ﬂavor of the analysis with the
possibility of ﬁrst-stage price contracts is similar to what we describe below, we choose to preserve
the simpler contracting environment.
6In other words, we assume that a ﬁrm’s input requirements are unique, and in particular diﬀerent
from those of other ﬁrms located at the same point on the unit circle. Also, ﬁnal producers may
not use components that nearly ﬁt but not precisely so. These assumptions simplify the analysis
without signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the nature of the hold-up problem.
8the supplier’s expertise. The contract can stipulate a level of investment, but not one
greater than γiwiµix. The constraint reﬂects the limit on veriﬁcation. The contract
also can specify a payment P i for which the downstream ﬁrm will be liable if the
supplier carries out the agreed investment. We assume Nash bargaining wherein the
parties share equally in the surplus that accrues from the contract.7
Let Si denote the proﬁts that the parties will share if the supplier develops a
component that ﬁts the buyer’s needs, and if the two parties subsequently negotiate
an eﬃcient order contract. The parties anticipate that if they reach a stage where
a suitable prototype exists, their negotiation will lead to an equal sharing of Si.S o
the parties each can expect to earn Si/2 if a ﬁrst-stage bargain is reached, and if the
supplier chooses to invest the full amount wiµix needed for production to proceed.
The supplier will not make the full investment in customization unless its share of
the prospective proﬁts, Si/2, exceeds the cost of that part of the investment that is
not governed by the contract. Thus, if (1 − γi)wiµix>S i/2, the supplier will invest
at most γiwiµix (doing so if and only if P i ≥ γiwiµix), and the ﬁnal producer will be
left with a component that is useless for its purposes. In such circumstances, there
is no surplus to be shared in the relationship, and so no deal is struck.8
Next note that, if Si/2 ≥ wiµix, it is worthwhile for the supplier to proceed with
the full investment in customization, even if there is no ﬁrst-stage contract and no
initial payment. Here, the supplier’s share of the prospective proﬁts covers the full
cost of the requisite investment. In such circumstances, the parties’ threat points in
the ﬁrst stage are Si/2 for the ﬁnal-good producer and Si/2−wiµix for the supplier
7In principle, the downstream ﬁrm might search for two potential suppliers, and then hold one
supplier in reserve to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis the other. Typically, this strategy
would not prove proﬁtable in the equilibria we describe. But, in any case, we wish to avoid a
taxonomic treatment with many diﬀerent strategies. Accordingly, we assume that, if a downstream
ﬁrm locates more than one potential supplier, it must choose one ﬁrm with which to conduct
negotations. In the event the negotiation with this ﬁrm fails, there is no time to take up with
another supplier. With this assumption, the outside options for both ﬁrms are zero.
8Note that this condition requires Si/2 ≥ wiµix when γi =0 ; this is the usual condition requiring
half of the surplus to cover the cost of the relationship-speciﬁc investment that applies when all
investment expenses are unveriﬁable.
9of inputs.9 But these options sum to exactly what the parties stand to share if they
reach a ﬁrst-stage agreement, which means that there is nothing to be gained from
signing a contract. It follows that the investment contract is a null contract in this
case, with P i =0a n dw i t hn or e q u i r e di n v e s t m e n t .
In contrast, when Si/2 <w iµix, the input producer will not make the investment
absent an ﬁrst-stage agreement with its customer. Meanwhile, when Si/2 ≥ (1 −
γi)wiµix, the supplier would be willing to make the unveriﬁable investment provided
the veriﬁable part is governed by a binding contract. In such circumstances, the
parties can generate proﬁts if they manage to conclude a ﬁrst-stage deal, but their
outside options are zero if their initial negotiation fails. The Nash bargain calls for
an equal sharing of surplus, which means an initial payment by the downstream ﬁrm
that provides equal net rewards to both parties. The ﬁnal producer’s reward net of
the payment is Si/2 − Pi, while the input producer’s reward net of the investment
cost is Si/2+Pi − wiµix. Equating the two, we have Pi = wiµix/2,w h e nx is
such that wiµix>S i/2 ≥ (1 − γi)wiµix. In other words, the two sides divide the
investment cost evenly.
To summarize, the investment contract and the induced investment behavior de-
pend upon the contracting environment in the supplier’s country, on the distance
between the supplier’s expertise and the ﬁnal producer’s input requirement, and on
the amount of potential proﬁts that would be generated by an eﬃcient order. Let
P i(x) be the payment that is dictated by an investment contract between a ﬁnal pro-
d u c e ri nt h eN o r t ha n da ni n p u ts u p p l i e ri nc o u n t r yi when the supplier’s expertise













9R e c a l lt h a t ,e v e ni ft h e r ei sn oﬁrst-stage contract, the supplier cannot commit to refrain from
negotiating an order contract in the second stage. Thus, the supplier has every incentive to make the











2.1.2 The Order Contract
Once the input supplier has sunk its investment in the prototype, the partners have
coincident interests regarding the production and marketing of the ﬁnal good. They
can write an eﬃcient contract to govern the manufacture and sale of the intermediate
inputs. The preferences in (1) imply that the producer of the jth variety of good y at
location l faces a demand given by
y (j,l)=Ap(j,l)
−ε , (4)











and Ei denotes spending on consumer goods in country i,f o ri = N,S.T h i s i s
a constant-elasticity demand function, which means that proﬁts are maximized by
mark-up pricing. Any partnership in which the supplier resides in country i faces a
marginal cost of output of wi.T h u s ,j o i n tp r o ﬁts are maximized by a price pi = wi/α
of ﬁnal output. Maximal joint proﬁts are
S






which are independent of the distance between the supplier’s expertise and the ﬁnal
producer’s input type. The order contract that generates the maximal joint proﬁts


















We consider now the search problem facing a ﬁrm that has developed a variety of
good y.T h e ﬁrm must decide where to look for a partner and the intensity of its
search eﬀort.11 Suppose the ﬁrm searches at intensity x in country i.I fx ≥ 1/2mi,
the ﬁrm will ﬁnd a potential partner with probability one. Otherwise, the probability
that it will ﬁnd a partner is 2mix,s i n c et h eﬁrms are spaced at distance 1/mi in
country i, and a search of intensity x covers an arc of length 2x.
There are two self-imposed bounds on the ﬁrm’s search intensity in country i.
First, the ﬁrm would never choose x greater than 1/2mi, because search is costly and
in our model there is no beneﬁtt oﬁnding a second partner whose expertise is less
suited to the ﬁrm’s input needs than the ﬁrst. Second, the ﬁrm would never choose
x greater than Si/2wiµi (1 − γi), because even if it found a potential supplier at such
10The payment is such that the input supplier’s reward net of manufacturing costs is half of the
joint proﬁts. Thus, the payment is Si/2+wiyi, which, with (6) and (7), implies the expressioin in
the text.
11We assume that ﬁnal producers search for an outsourcing partner in only one country. This
could be justiﬁed by assuming that the entry cost fn incorporates a component that is a ﬁxed cost
of search (independent of intensity) and that a ﬁrm choosing to search in both markets would have
to bear this cost twice. If this cost element were large enough, then search in two countries would
be unproﬁtable.
The equilibria described below with outsourcing in both countries would remain equilibria even
if we were to allow ﬁrms to search in both markets. In these equilibria, some ﬁrms break even by
searching only in the North and others by searching only in the South, so a ﬁrm that searched in
both places would suﬀer an expected loss. However, if ﬁr m sw e r ef r e et os e a r c hi nb o t hm a r k e t s ,
there might be additional equilibria in which all ﬁr m ss e a r c hi nb o t hc o u n t r i e s ,a n dﬁrms that ﬁnd
potential partners in both places choose ex post where to outsource. This choice would be based on
the distance between their input requirement and the expertise of the two potential partners and
on the proﬁt opportunities that would ensue from production of intermediates in the alternative
locations.
12a distance, the input producer would be unwilling to make the necessary investment
in customization, in view of the contracting environment in country i. Accordingly, a

























2wiµi (1 − γi)
.( 1 0 )
In (8), the ﬁrst term is the expected proﬁts for the ﬁrm considering all the diﬀerent
partners it might ﬁnd at the various distances q (and the possibility that it may ﬁnd
no partner at all), and the second term is the cost of the search.12
We let ri denote the optimal intensity of search for a ﬁnal producer that searches
in country i. There are several cases to consider, depending upon whether one or the
other or neither of the constraints binds in the determination of ri. We will not say
anything more about that here, but will postpone further discussion of the optimal
search intensity until after we have described the remaining equilibrium conditions.
Once we have rN and rS, we can identify the market or markets in which the
Northern ﬁrms will choose to search. If πN
n (rN) > πS
n(rS), all search is conducted in
the North and all outsourcing takes place there. Similarly, if πS
n(rS) > πN
n (rN),a l l
search focuses on the South and there is no domestic outsourcing. Mostly, we will




2.3 Free Entry and Market Clearing
The remaining equilibrium conditions comprise a set of free-entry conditions for pro-
ducers of intermediate and ﬁnal goods, and a pair of market-clearing conditions for
12Rauch and Trindade (2000) have also developed a trade model in which ﬁr m sh a v et obem a t c h e d .
But their formulation is very diﬀerent from ours.
13the two labor markets.
Final-good producers must enter in positive numbers, since consumers spend a
constant fraction of their income on diﬀerentiated products. All entrants earn zero
expected proﬁts in equilibrium. The expected operating proﬁts for a typical ﬁrm that






, and the free-entry condition is
πn = w
Nfn.( 1 1 )
Intermediate-good producers may enter in one or both countries.13 A ﬁrm that
enters in country i will serve a measure 2niri of ﬁnal-good producers, where ni is the
total measure of ﬁnal-good producers that searches in country i.Aﬁrm’s customers
are spread uniformly at distances ranging from 0 to ri in each direction from the
point representing the ﬁrm’s expertise. An intermediate-good producer earns proﬁts
of P i(x)+Si/2−wiµix from its relationship with a ﬁnal-good producer whose input
r e q u i r e m e n ti sa tad i s t a n c ex from its own expertise. Thus, potential operating

















dx.( 1 2 )
We assume that the number of entrants is suﬃciently large so that, in making its

















i =0 for i = N,S.
We turn next to the labor-market clearing condition in the South. We examine
equilibria in which the wage rate in the North is higher than the wage rate in the
South, so that ω ≡ wN/wS > 1. In such equilibria, the entire world output of the
homogeneous good z is produced in the South. Since aggregate proﬁts are zero in both
13The intermediate producers also choose their expertise (i.e., location). We assume that this
choice is made with rational expectations about the choices of others. It is a dominant strategy for
each ﬁrm to locate at a point mid-way between the expected locations of the two most-distantly-
spaced adjacent producers of intermediates. This strategy gives rise to a symmetric equilibrium
with equi-spaced input producers.
14countries, all income is labor income. Aggregate spending equals aggregate income
in country i, which implies that Ei = wiLi,w h e r eLi is the labor supply there. A
fraction 1 − β of spending is devoted to homogeneous goods, which carry a price of
wS. This means that in equilibrium the South employs (1 − β)(ωLN + LS) units of
labor in the production of good z.
The South also devotes labor to entry by input producers, to investment in cus-
tomization, and to the manufacture of components. Entry absorbs mSfS
m units of
labor. Customization requires µSx units of labor for a ﬁnal-good producer whose
needs are a distance x from the expertise of the input producer. Each of the mS
producers of intermediates undertakes such an investment for all ﬁnal-good producers
that search in the South and that are located within rS to its right or to its left. Since
a constant density nS of ﬁnal-ﬁnal producers searches in the South, the Southern la-
bor needed for developing prototypes is 2µSmSnS R rS
0 xdx = µSmSnS(rS)2. Finally,
the density nS of Northern ﬁrms searching in the South results in a measure 2mSrSnS
of bilateral matches. Each such match generates a demand for yS units of Southern
labor to manufacture components. Therefore, manufacturing absorbs 2mSrSnSyS
units of Southern labor. Summing the components of labor demand, and equating
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In the North, labor is used in the design of ﬁnal goods, in searching for outsourcing
partners, and in entry, investment and manufacturing by producers of intermediate
goods. The ﬁxed costs of entry by ﬁnal-good producers requires (nN + nS)fn units
of labor. The search for partners by these ﬁrms requires an additional nNηN(rN)2 +
nSηS(rS)2 units of labor. The components of labor demand by intermediate-good
producers in the North are analogous to those in the South. Therefore, the labor-
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This completes the description of the model.
153 Outsourcing with Unveriﬁable Investment
To gain an understanding of the workings of the model, we begin with a case in which
incomplete contracting takes an extreme form: none of the supplier’s investment in
customization is veriﬁable by an outside party. We examine the case with γN = γS =
0 to shed light on the technological determinants of outsourcing behavior.
With γN = γS =0 , the ﬁrst-stage negotiations are pointless. The input supplier
cannot commit to undertake any investment, so the ﬁnal producer will not promise
any up-front payment. Instead, the supplier invests in customization if and only if its
prospective share of the proﬁts from the bilateral relationship exceeds the total cost of
developing the prototype. According to (3), with γi =0 , Ii = wiµix if Si/2 ≥ wiµix
and Ii =0otherwise.
We return now to the problem facing the ﬁnal-good producer as regards the choice
of search intensity in a given market. As we noted before, the ﬁnal-good producer
searching in country i maximizes πi
n given in (8), subject to (9) and (10). There are
diﬀerent possible solutions to this problem depending upon which, if either, of the
constraints binds. Let us suppose ﬁrst that (10) binds, as illustrated in Figure 2.
The ﬁgure shows the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost of search as functions of the
search intensity. The beneﬁt of a more intensive search is an improved prospect for
ﬁnding a partner. Since the probability of ﬁnding one rises linearly with the search
intensity (provided that x<1/2mi) and the prospective proﬁts are independent of
x (provided that x ≤ Si/2wiµi, so that the supplier will invest in customization),
the marginal beneﬁt is constant for low values of x. The marginal cost of added
search is 2wNηix, an increasing function of x.T h e ﬁgure depicts circumstances in
which the marginal beneﬁt is relatively high, so that it exceeds the marginal cost
at x = Si/2wiµi.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e ﬁnal producer would be willing to search still
further than this, but for its recognition that any partner it might ﬁnd at such a
great distance would not be willing to undertake the investment in customization.
We shall refer to this case as one of a binding investment constraint.
Another possibility, illustrated in Figure 3, is that neither constraint binds. This
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Figure 2: Choice of ri: Binding investment constraint
cost of search rises steeply. We call this the case of costly search.I t r e s u l t s i n a
search intensity determined by equating the (positive) marginal beneﬁto fs e a r c ht o
the marginal cost.
The ﬁnal possibility is that constraint (9) binds, as it will if Si/wiµi > 1/mi
and the marginal beneﬁt of search exceeds the marginal cost at x =1 /2mi.I nt h i s
case (not shown), the ﬁnal producer searches a distance equal to the space between
input suppliers, thereby ensuring itself of ﬁnding an outsourcing partner. This case
of assured matching is less interesting than the others, so we will pay little attention
to it.
It is worth emphasizing that the thickness of the market has an important bearing
on the search decision. If there are many input producers, then ceteris paribus the
marginal beneﬁt of search will be large. In such circumstances, the ﬁnal producer
is more likely to search until it surely ﬁnds a partner, or else be constrained by the
unwillingness of some potential suppliers to invest in a prototype. Also, the proﬁt
opportunity aﬀects the incentives to search. Of course, the two are related: the
greater is the number of intermediate producers, the greater will be the fraction of
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Figure 3: Choice of ri:C o s t l ys e a r c h
a particular variety. While mi and Si separately aﬀect the search decision, these
variables are jointly determined in the general equilibrium.
We are prepared now to write an equation for ri as a function of mi,Si,a n d
the wages. This equation delineates the various “regimes” to be considered. First,
when neither constraint binds, ri = miSi/2wNηi. Neither constraint will bind if
mi <w Nηi/wiµi (so that ri < 2Si/wiµi)a n dmi <
p
wNηi/Si (so that ri < 1/2mi).
Second, ri = Si/2wiµi w h e nt h ei n v e s t m e n tc o n s t r a i n tb i n d s ,a si td o e sw h e nmi falls
between wNηi/wiµi and wiµi/Si. Finally, assured matching implies ri =1 /2mi,a n d




   
   
miSi
















.( 1 5 )
There are obviously many cases to consider, and we shall not dwell on all of them.
There might be equilibria with outsourcing in both countries and any combination
of binding investment, costly search and assured matching in each one. This gives
nine possible combinations. And there might be equilibria in which only one country
supplies all of the intermediate goods. Again, that country may be characterized by a
18binding investment constraint, costly search, or assured matching. In what follows we
will discuss the procedure for ﬁnding all of the equilibria for a given set of parameter
values, and then concentrate on the comparative statics in selected regimes.
3.1 Equilibria
To identify equilibria, we construct a pair of reduced-form curves, one representing
the labor-market clearing condition in the North and the other representing the labor-
market clearing condition in the South. In deriving these curves we incorporate the
zero-proﬁt conditions as well as the equilibrium search intensities. The curves are
constructed as follows. First, we hypothesize a combination of search regimes in the
North and the South, and derive the combinations of mN and mS that are consistent
with labor-market clearing in each region under the maintained hypothesis. Then we
ﬁnd the region in (mN,m S) space in which the hypothesized combination of search
regimes is realized. We repeat this procedure for all possible combinations of regimes
and “connect up” the curves at the boundaries between the regimes. The points of
intersection between the curves so constructed are equilibria of the world economy.
We illustrate the construction of the reduced-form curves for the case of a binding
investment constraint in both the North and the South. Other cases are discussed in
Appendix A.
When the binding constraint on search is the willingness of input suppliers to
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Next, we use (8) and (11), together with the recognition that πN
n = πS
n if out-










Nfn for i = N,S .( 1 9 )

























that is, the value of labor used by ﬁnal-good producers for product design and search
amounts to a fraction (1−α)β/2 of world income. Finally, we substitute this equation




















N .( 2 0 )
The two equations, (18) and (20), involve mS, mN, and the relative wage, ω.B u t
the relative wage can be solved as a function of mS and mN using the requirement
that, if mS and mN are both positive, search for input suppliers must be equally
proﬁtable in both countries. Substituting (16) into (19) and noting that (6) im-
plies SN = ω1−εSS,w ec a nw r i t ea ne q u a l - p r o ﬁt condition for the case with binding
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14We also use yi = αSi/(1 − α)wi, which follows from (6) and (7).
15The derivation uses the fact that pi = wi/α for all diﬀerentiated products assembled using
intermediate inputs from country i, and that the number of varieties of good y that are actually
































Figure 4: Equilibria with binding investment constraints in North and South
This equation allows us to solve for the relative wage as a function of the numbers of
intermediate-good producers in the two countries, which we denote by ω(mS,m N).
Substituting ω(mS,m N) for ω in equation (18) yields the reduced-form SS curve that
applies when the investment constraint binds in both places. Substituting ω(mS,m N)
for ω in (20) yields the analogous NN curve.
Now we identify the region of (mN,m S) space in which the indicated equations
apply. According to (15), the investment constraint binds in the South when mS
falls between ωηS/µS and wSµS/SS. But (16) and (19) imply that mS ≤ wSµS/SS
whenever 4fn
¡
mS¢2−2µSmS/ω+ηS ≤ 0.T h u s ,t h eSS curve has the indicated form
in the region where mS ≥ ω(mN,m S)ηS/µS and 4fn
¡
mS¢2 − 2µSmS/ω(mN,m S)+
ηS ≤ 0. Similarly, we ﬁnd that the NN curve has the indicated form in the region
where mN ≥ ηN/µN and 4fn
¡
mN¢2 − 2µNmN + ηN ≤ 0. Outside of these regions,
the curves obey diﬀerent formulas, as detailed in Appendix A.
Figure 4 shows the SS and NN curves for one set of parameter values.16 The
16The parameter values for the case illustrated are: α =1 /2, β =2 /5, µS = µN =1 ,
ηS =1 0 0 , ηN =6 0 , fS
m = fN
m = fn =1 /1200, LS =1 0 .5,a n dLN =3 .5. The curves
have been drawn using Mathematica 4.1. The simulation program can be downloaded from
http://www.princeton.edu/~grossman/grossman_working_papers.htm or obtained from either of



















Figure 5: An equilibrium with a binding investment constraint in North and costly
search in South
dashed line represents combinations of mS and mN for which ω =1 .O n l y p o i n t s
a b o v ea n dt ot h el e f to ft h i sl i n e( w h i c hh a v eω > 1) are of interest to us. The dotted
horizontal lines show the boundaries between the regions of costly search and binding
investment in the North (the lowermost line), and between binding investment and
assured matching in the North (the uppermost line). The dotted curves show the
boundaries between the regions of costly search and binding investment in the South
(the left-most curve), and between binding investment and assured matching in the
South (the right-most curve). Thus, the ﬁgure shows two equilibria, labelled E1 and
E2, each characterized by active outsourcing in both countries and binding investment
constraints in both places.
Figure 5 shows the NN and SS curves for a diﬀerent set of parameter values.17
This ﬁgure shows only the boundaries between the regions of costly search and binding
investment in each country, because the other boundary curves fall outside the range
the authors. We thank Yossi Hadar for writing the program.
17These parameter are: α =1 /2, β =1 /2, µS = µN =1 , ηS =1 0 0 , ηN =6 0 , fS
m = fN
m = fn =
1/1200, LS =3 .535 and LN =1 .55.
22of values illustrated in the ﬁgure. Here, there again are two equilibria with outsourcing
in both countries. The point labelled E1 has binding investment constraints in both
places; that labelled E2 has a binding investment constraint in the North and a regime
of costly search in the South.
Parameter values also exist for which there are four diﬀerent equilibria with out-
sourcing in both countries. The reader can picture such a situation by reexamining
Figure 5 and imagining that the NN curve were just a bit higher than the one shown
there. Then the curve would intersect the SS curve twice in the region with costly
search in the South and twice more in the region with a binding investment constraint
in the South. In this case, all four equilibria would be characterized by a binding
investment constraint in the North.
The possibility of multiple equilibria reﬂects an important feedback mechanism
in the model. The greater is the number of input suppliers in a country, the more
proﬁtable it is for ﬁnal producers to search for partners there. This is because a search
of given intensity is more likely to turn up a potential partner when there are more
input suppliers to be found. Moreover, when such a search does turn up a partner,
that partner will be more likely to be willing to undertake the needed investment in
customization. At the same time, the greater is the number of ﬁnal producers that
search for partners in a given country, the more proﬁtable it is for an input producer
to operate there.18
The positive feedback associated with the thick-market externality is, however,
limited by a wage response. As more intermediate producers enter in a country, their
demand for labor bids up the country’s relative wage. This tends to dampen the in-
centive of ﬁnal producers to search there. In our model, the general-equilibrium wage
response creates the possibility of multiple equilibria with production of intermediate
inputs in both countries and diﬀerent patterns of outsourcing.
When several equilibria exist, it is natural to ask which ones are stable. We have
18McLaren (2000) was the ﬁrst to study the thick-market externality in international trade. He
pointed out that this externality can give rise to multiple equilibria when ﬁrms can choose between
outsourcing and in-house production.
23conducted a stability analysis and report the results in Appendix B. In the analysis,
we take the numbers of each type of ﬁrm (ﬁnal producers, intermediate producers in
the North, and intermediate producers in the South) as the state variables and assume
that entry and exit respond to proﬁt opportunities. When proﬁts net of entry costs
are positive for a typical ﬁrm of a given type, more ﬁrms of that type enter. When
proﬁts are negative, ﬁrms exit. With this adjustment process, stability requires that
the NN and SS curves both be downward sloping and that the SS curve be the
steeper of the two at the point of intersection. Thus, the equilibria labelled E1 in
Figures 4 and 5 are stable, whereas those labelled E2 are not.
There also may be equilibria with outsourcing concentrated in one country. For
example, an equilibrium with all outsourcing in the North (and ω > 1)a l w a y se x i s t s
when βLS > (1 − β)LN.I ns u c ha ne q u i l i b r i u m ,ω = βLS/(1 − β)LN,a n d t h e f a c t
that there are no input suppliers in the South (mS =0 ) discourages ﬁnal producers
from searching there. Given that no ﬁnal producers search for partners in the South,
no input suppliers have an incentive to enter there. The equilibrium can be one with
costly search, a binding investment constraint, or assured matching in the North,
depending upon the size of the cost and demand parameters. When an equilibrium
exists with all outsourcing activity concentrated in the North, that equilibrium always
is stable. We do not consider such equilibria further in this paper.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we study how the pattern of outsourcing and world trade are aﬀected
by the sizes of the two countries and by the technologies for search and customiza-
tion. We begin with country size, because this allows us to illustrate some important
properties of the model.
4.1 Country Size
Consider growth in the resource endowment of the South, as would be reﬂected in














Figure 6: Labor supply growth in the South
depicted in Figure 6 by point E1. No matter whether the South is in a regime with
costly search or a binding investment constraint an increase in LS shifts the SS curve
to right. This is because the added labor in the South more than suﬃces to serve the
country’s increased demand for homogeneous goods. The new SS curve is represented
by the broken curve in the ﬁgure. In the North, the growth in Southern income means
additional demand for diﬀerentiated products, and thus a greater demand for labor
by ﬁnal-good producers. This implies a leftward shift of the NN curve, as shown in
the ﬁgure. The new equilibrium is at point E2.
Evidently, expansion in the South induces entry by local producers of intermediate
goods and exit by such producers in the North. This has immediate implications for
the composition of world outsourcing activity. We deﬁne the volume of outsourcing
as vi =2 miriniyi; that is, the number of units of intermediate goods manufactured
by input suppliers in country i. In a regime with a binding investment constraint, for
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In this case, the volume of outsourcing in a country is proportional to the number
of input producers active there. In all regimes, an increase in LS boosts outsourcing
25activity in the South while diminishing such activity in the North.
It is interesting to note the eﬀect on the relative wage. Figure 6 shows the com-
binations of mN and mS that imply the same relative wage as at point E1.T h e s e
points satisfy ω(mS,m N)=ω1,w h e r eω1 is the relative wage at E1 and ω(mS,m N) is
the wage that ensures equal proﬁts from search in both places. When the investment
constraint binds in both countries, the equal-proﬁt condition (21) implies that the
l o c u so fp o i n t sw i t hω(mS,m N)=ω1 is a line with positive slope. The relationship
need not be linear for other combinations of regimes, as can be seen by inspecting the
various equal-proﬁt conditions given in Appendix A, but it is always upward sloping.
Points above the curve correspond to a higher relative wage in the North than ω1,
while points below the curve correspond to a higher relative wage for the South.
We see that, as long as outsourcing continues to take place in both countries, an
increase in LS must boost the relative wage of the South. The direct eﬀect of an
increase in LS is to generate excess supply for labor in the South and excess demand
in the North. But the shift in outsourcing activity has the opposite eﬀects. Moreover,
the thick-market externality implies that outsourcing is an increasing returns activity
at the industry level. Only when the wage of the North falls relative to that of the
South will the ﬁnal producers ﬁnd it to be equally proﬁt a b l et os e a r c hi ne i t h e rr e g i o n
in view of the now thinner market in the North and the thicker market in the South.
An increase in LS also increases the value of world trade, the share of trade in
world income, and the fraction of world trade that is intra-industry trade. The value
of world trade is the sum of the value of Northern imports of homogeneous goods,
the value of Southern imports of ﬁnal goods, and the value of Northern imports of
components. But trade balance implies that the total value of Southern imports,
βwSLS, equals the value of its exports of homogeneous goods and of components.
Therefore, the value of world trade is
T =2 βw
SL
S,( 2 3 )
which rises with LS when measured either in terms of the numeraire good (so that






ωLN + LS (24)
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It is clear that both of these ratios rise with LS,b e c a u s et h ed i r e c te ﬀect and the
indirect eﬀect that derives from the change in the relative wage both point in the
same direction.
We will not repeat the analysis for the case of an increase in LN.T h er e a d e rm a y
conﬁrm that the qualitative eﬀects on the number of intermediate producers in each
country, the location of outsourcing activity, the relative wage, the ratio of trade to
world income, and the share of intra-industry trade are just the opposite of those for
an increase in LS.20
4.2 Outsourcing Technology
The technology for outsourcing is reﬂected in the parameters that describe the cost
of search (ηi) and the cost of customization (µi). Arguably, improvements in trans-
portation and communication technology have lowered the cost of search for outsourc-
ing partners. The internet, especially, has facilitated business-to-business matching.
Also, changes in production methods associated with computer-aided design may
19The volume of intra-industry trade is deﬁned as twice the smaller of the North’s exports of
diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods and the South’s exports of intermediates. In this case, the latter quantity
is smaller. Since the volume of these exports equals βLS − (1 − β)ωLN (the diﬀerence between
the South’s imports of diﬀerentiated goods and the South’s exports of homogeneous goods, the
expression in (25) follows from (23).
20An equi-proportionate increase in the size of both countries is not neutral with respect to the
composition of outsourcing activity. To see this, suppose to the contrary that mS and mN were
to grow by the same proportion as LS and LN. By (18) and (20), this can be consistent with
labor clearing in both countries only if the relative wage ω remains unchanged. But the equal-proﬁt
condition (21) implies that the relative wage cannot remain unchanged when mS and mN grow
proportionately, except if search costs in both region are negligible.
27have reduced the cost of customizing components. We investigate how improvements
in the search and investment technologies aﬀect the location of outsourcing activity.
First, consider an equi-proportionate improvement in all search and investment
technologies; i.e., ηN, ηS, µN and µS all fall by similar percentages of their initial
values. From the equal-proﬁt condition (21) for the regime with binding investment
constraints in both countries, we see that this change has no eﬀect on the relative
proﬁtability of searching in the North versus the South. The same conclusion applies
for the other combinations of regimes, as can be seen in Appendix A. Thus, there is no
shift in the relative wage function, ω(mS,m N). Moreover, the search and investment
parameters either do not appear directly in the reduced-form SS and NN equations
(as is the case when the investment constraint binds), or they appear only in ratio
form. It follows that a uniform improvement in search and investment technologies
leaves all of these curves in their initial locations. There is no aﬀect on the number
of intermediate-good producers in either country, on the relative wage, on the levels
of outsourcing activity, or on the level and composition of international trade.
When the technologies for search and investment improve worldwide, the prof-
itability of search rises in both locations. Final producers respond by conducting
more intensive searches for outsourcing partners, irrespective of the location of their
search. The more intensive search eﬀorts generate an increased number of bilateral
matches. As a result, consumers enjoy a greater variety of diﬀerentiated products,
while they consume smaller quantities of each one.
Now we consider an improvement in technology in the South alone. This im-
provement may be reﬂe c t e di nad e c l i n ei ns e a r c hc o s t s( f a l li nηS) or a decline in the
cost to a Southern producer of customizing a component (fall in µS), or both. To
limit repetition, we will formally investigate only the case in which the investment
constraint binds in both countries, although similar results can be derived for other
combinations of regimes.
When ηS or µS falls, it becomes more proﬁtable for ﬁnal producers to search for
partners in the South at the initial relative wage. The relative wage of the North
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Figure 7: Technological improvement in the South
words, the technological improvements in the South cause the ω(mS,m N) function
to shift down. But then the SS curve shifts up and the NN curve shifts to the left,
as illustrated in Figure 7. The equilibrium moves from E1 to E2, corresponding to
an increase in the number of input suppliers in the South and a fall in their number
in the North. Outsourcing activity shifts from North to South (see(22)).
The fall in ηS or µS implies, by (21), that the relative wage ω1 can be achieved
with a smaller number of input suppliers in the South (given mN) than was true
before the technological change. Thus, the ω = ω1 curve shifts to the left, as drawn.
At E2, the relative wage of the North is lower than ω1. It follows, from (24) and (25),
that an improvement in the search technology or the investment technology in the
South results in an increased ratio of trade to world income and an increased share
of intra-industry trade.
To summarize, a rise in international outsourcing with concomitant growth in the
importance of trade and of intra-industry trade can be explained by improvements in
the technologies for search and customization, but only if these improvements have
occurred to a disproportionate extent in the South. It is certainly plausible that such
technological catch-up has taken place in recent years.
295 The Contracting Environment
We return now to a setting in which the relationship-speciﬁc investments are partially
veriﬁable In this setting, the ﬁnal producer and its potential supplier can write
an incomplete contract governing investment in the prototype. The contract can
require the ﬁnal producer to pay an agreed amount to the input supplier if the latter
carries out a subset of the investments needed for customization of the input. The
speciﬁed investment can include at most the fraction γi of the tasks needed for full
customization that are veriﬁable by the courts. We take γi < 1/2 to be an exogenous
measure of the contracting environment in country i.
To derive the reduced-form SS and NN equations, we need to revisit the optimal
search problem facing a ﬁnal producer in this environment. Consider a producer that
searches in country i. According to (2) and (3), if this producer ﬁnds a partner whose
expertise lies at a distance x ≤ Si/2wiµi from its input needs, the partner inevitably
undertakes the necessary investment in a prototype and the contractual payment is
zero. If the distance x between the partner’s expertise and the producer’s needs is
between Si/2wiµi and Si/2wiµi(1 − γi), the investment takes place, but at a cost to
the ﬁnal producer of Pi = wiµix/2. Finally, if the distance x exceeds Si/2wiµi(1−γi),
the input supplier does not undertake any of the tasks associated with customizing
the component that are not veriﬁable by the court.
As we have noted, a ﬁnal producer chooses its search intensity to maximize its
expected proﬁts in (8), subject to (9) and (10). The solution is illustrated in Figure
8. In the ﬁgure, the marginal cost of search is a rising linear function of intensity,
with slope 2wNηi. The marginal beneﬁto fs e a r c hi sc o n s t a n ta n de q u a lt omiSi for all
search distances that result in only matches involving an up-front payment of zero.
For distances beyond Si/2wiµi,t h eﬁnal producer’s gain from a match is reduced
by the amount of its expected ﬁrst-stage payment. This payment grows with the
distance between the ﬁnal producer and its partner. Thus, the marginal beneﬁto f
search falls discontinuously at Si/2wiµi, the smallest distance for which Pi > 0,a n d
falls linearly thereafter until x = Si/2wiµi(1 − γi). At distances still greater than
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Figure 8: Choice of search intensity with γi > 0: binding investment constraint
the marginal beneﬁto fs e a r c hi sz e r o .
Figure 8 depicts a case in which the investment constraint binds. Here, the mar-
ginal beneﬁto fs e a r c ha tx ≤ Si/2wiµi(1 − γi) exceeds the marginal cost; but the
ﬁnal producer does not search any further than x = Si/2wiµi(1−γi),b e c a u s eam o r e
distant potential partner would not make the full investment in customization given
the prevailing contracting environment. Other possible regimes arise when the MB
curve intersects the MC curve where the former is ﬂat and the latter is rising, when
the intersection comes at the point of discontinuity of MB, when the intersection
comes where the MB curve is falling, or when matching is assured.21
21Formally, the solution to the ﬁnal producer’s problem is
ri =

          
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;
31Changes in the contracting environment can aﬀect the outsourcing equilibrium
only when they alter the ﬁnal producer’s search decision in at least one country, or
when they change the payment from ﬁnal-good producers to their suppliers. But
search intensity and expected payments by the ﬁnal producer are independent of γi
except when the investment constraint binds. To focus on the most interesting case,
we henceforth assume that the investment constraint binds in both countries.
When the investment constraint binds in country i, producers search up to the
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Expected operating proﬁts for a ﬁnal producer searching in country i can be calculated
using (2), (19) and (26). Equating these expected proﬁts to the ﬁxed cost of product























Nfn for i = N,S .( 2 7 )
The diﬀerence between this equation and (19) – that applied when γi =0–i s
the second term in the square brackets. When multiplied by ri his term reﬂects the
expected ﬁrst-stage payment by a ﬁnal producer that searches according to (26).
Similarly, we can use (2) and (12) to calculate the operating proﬁts for a compo-
nent producer in country i. Equating these to the ﬁxed cost of entry (and thereby
























m for i = N,S .( 2 8 )
The second term in the square brackets times rini is the total amount of up-front
payments received by the typical input supplier from its various customers.
We now are ready to derive the reduced-form labor market clearing conditions
that apply when γi > 0 and the investment constraint binds in both countries. Sub-
stituting (6), (7), (26) and (28) into (13), we ﬁnd that
i.e., the largest value of mi for which 2
¡
mi¢2 Si ≤ 2wNηi + miwiµi. Note that γi =0is a special
case in which there is no discontinuity in the MB curve and no downward-sloping segment. Then
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Notice that (29) reduces to (18) when γS =0 .


























































The ﬁrst three terms on the left-hand side of (30) represent the total demand for labor
by ﬁnal-good producers for entry and search, while the last term represents the labor
used by intermediate producers in the North for entry, investment, and production.
To complete the construction of the reduced-form SS and NN curves, we need
an equal-proﬁt condition that will allow us to replace the relative wage ω in (29)
and (30) by a function ω(mS,m N). We substitute (6) and (26) into the free-entry
condition for ﬁnal producers (27), and equate the expected operating proﬁts from
search in either country, to derive
ω1−2ε






































.( 3 1 )
The left-hand side of (31) is an increasing function of γN for all values of γN between
z e r oa n do n e - h a l fw h i l et h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 3 1 )i sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fγS
for all such values of γS.22 This means that – holding the relative wage and the
thickness of each market constant – an improvement in the contracting environment
in a country raises the relative proﬁtability to ﬁnal producers of searching there.
22To substantiate this claim, we make use of the fact that mi ≥ 2ηi/µi(1 − 2γi) in a regime with
a binding investment constraint in country i, as can be seen in footnote 16.
335.1 Improvements in Contracting in the North
We begin by examining improvements in the contracting environment in the North.
Suppose that, initially, γN = γS =0 , and consider a marginal increase in γN.A s
we have just noted, this raises the relative proﬁtability of search in the North. The
relative wage ω must rise at given mS and mN to equalize the expected proﬁts from
search in either market.
The upward shift in ω(mS,m N) induces an inward shift of the SS curve, as we
have depicted in Figure 9. This shift reﬂects the greater amount of Southern labor
needed to produce homogeneous goods for the now better-paid Northern consumers.
In the Northern labor market, there are several inﬂuences to be assessed. First,
the fall in the relative wage of the South spells a reduction in Southern demand for
diﬀerentiated products, which tends to reduce employment by ﬁnal producers. The
demand for labor by ﬁnal producers at given mN also falls for another reason: the
improved contracting environment facilitates investment by intermediate producers,
which means that ﬁnal producers are willing to search at greater distance in the input
space. Since each ﬁnal producer ultimately has a better chance of ﬁnding a suitable
partner, there are more ﬁnal goods produced for any given number of entrants. The
increased competition in the market for diﬀerentiated products means that fewer
such producers enter. This eﬀect is reﬂected in the second term on the left-hand
side of (30), which is zero when γN =0but turns negative as γN grows. The fall in
labor demand by ﬁnal-good producers is oﬀset, however, by an increase in demand
by component producers, which reﬂects their greater numbers of customers and their
higher investment levels; the fourth term on the left-hand side of (30) grows with γN.
It is easy to verify that these latter two eﬀects exactly oﬀset one another when γN
increases slightly from zero. This leaves only the eﬀect of the rise in ω(mS,m N),a n d
so the NN curve shifts out, as illustrated in the ﬁgure.
The net result is an increase in the number of component producers in the North,
a decline in the number of component producers in the South, and a hike in the
North’s relative wage. This can be seen in Figure 9, which shows the new equilibrium













ω   = ω 1
Figure 9: Contracting improves in the North: Low initial γN
line parallel to ω = ω1, which shows the combinations of mS and mN that give the
same relative wage as at E1 considering the change in the contracting environment
that has taken place. It is also easy to show that the volume of domestic outsourcing
rises while the volume of international outsourcing falls.23 Since equations (24) and
(25) describe the ratio of trade to world income and the share of intra-industry trade
in total trade, respectively, and both decline with the relative wage in the North, it
follows that the ratio of trade to world income and the share of intra-industry trade
in total trade both fall.
While an initial improvement in contracting conditions in the North causes out-
sourcing to relocate from the South, further improvements in the contract environ-
ment need not have this eﬀect. In fact, once γN is positive, the boost in labor demand
by component producers at given ω and mN induced by further growth in γN out-
w e i g h st h ef a l li ns u c hd e m a n db yﬁnal-good producers (i.e., the fourth term in (30)









So vN grows, because there are more Northern intermediate producers and each one produces more
components. In the South, the fall in outsourcing results from the exit of Southern input suppliers.
35grows by more than the second term shrinks). Still, there is an additional fall in de-
mand by ﬁnal-good producers owing to the decline in Southern income (and reﬂected
in the shift in ω(mS,m N)). On net, the NN curve may shift in either direction.
It is easy to ﬁnd situations in which an increase in γN from an initially high level
causes exit by intermediate-good producers in the North, entry by intermediate-good
producers in the South, and an expansion in international outsourcing and trade.24
We have solved the model numerically for a wide variety of parameter values. In
these computations, we generally took search costs to be negligible, so that the invest-
ment constraints would bind in any equilibrium without assured matching. Holding
γS =0 ,w ev a r i e dγN gradually from zero to 0.4 and found a recurring pattern.
Namely, the volume of outsourcing in the North rises then falls as γN increases, but
always remains above the level for γN =0 . Meanwhile, the volume of outsourcing
in the South falls and then rises, while remaining below the level for γN =0 .T h e
relative wage of the North rises, then falls, which implies that the ratio of world
trade to world income and the share of intra-industry trade in total trade do just the
opposite.25
5.2 Improvements in Contracting Worldwide
Before we turn to the contract environment of the South, it is helpful to discuss
the eﬀects of worldwide gains in contracting possibilities. We again take an initial
24This occurs, for example, whenever search costs are low in both countries and γN > ¯ γN,w h e r e




1 − ¯ γN − 1
2 (¯ γN)
2 =
1 − 2¯ γN
2 − 3¯ γN + 1
2 (¯ γN)
2 .
The value of ¯ γN has been calculated so that the downward shift in SS at the initial mS exactly
matches the downward shift in NN. With this initial value of γN, an improvement in the contracting
environment in the North results in a fall in mN and no change in mS or the relative wage. For still
larger initial values of γN than ¯ γN,t h eNN curve shifts down by more than the SS curve, so mS
rises and mN falls.
25Such a pattern obtains, for example, when ηN = ηS =0 , µN = µS =5 0 , α =0 .5, β =0 .75,
fN
m = fS
m =0 .01, LN =4 0and LS =3 2 .
36situation with unveriﬁable investment in both countries (γN = γS = γ =0 ) but this
time consider a change in the legal environment that makes some investment tasks
contractible in both countries (dγ > 0). We will show that, perhaps surprisingly,
such a development would not be neutral with respect to the siting of outsourcing
activity.
From the equal-proﬁt condition (31) we see that an increase in a common γ from
an initial level of γ =0raises the relative proﬁtability of outsourcing in the North
(at given ω, mS and mN)i fmNηS/µS >m SηN/µN and raises the relative proﬁtabil-
ity of outsourcing in the South if the inequality runs in the opposite direction. If
mNηS/µS = mSηN/µN – as would be the case, for example, were search costs to
be negligible in both countries – then the change in the common contract parame-
ter would have no direct eﬀe c to nt h er e l a t i v ep r o ﬁtability of outsourcing in either
location. We take this as our benchmark case – with the implication that a small
increase in γ leaves the function ω(mS,m N) undisturbed.
With no shift in ω(mS,m N),a ni n c r e a s ei nγ must shift the SS curve to the left,
as depicted in Figure 10. As can be seen from (29), an increase in γS increases the
demand for labor (at given mS and ω) by Southern producers of components. These
producers need more labor, because they undertake more investment and serve more
customers. The NN curve, in contrast, shifts to the right. While it is true that
Northern component producers demand more labor (at given mN and ω)f o rm u c h
the same reason as their Southern counterparts, this is more than oﬀset by a decline
in employment by ﬁnal producers. As we noted previously, at γN =0 ,t h es e c o n d
term on the left-hand side of (30) decreases with γN b yt h es a m ea m o u n ta st h e
fourth term increases. But now we also have a decline in the third term of (30)
due to the growth in γS. The additional relationships that are consummated by
ﬁnal producers with input suppliers in the South are an added source of intensiﬁed
competition in the product market. In response, ﬁnal producers exit in even greater
number than they do when contracting improves only in the North. The result is an
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Figure 10: Contracting improves worldwide
As the ﬁgure shows, a worldwide improvement in contracting possibilities is not
neutral with respect to the location of outsourcing. In the new equilibrium at E2,
there are more producers of components in the North and fewer producers of compo-
nents in the South than before. The improvement in the legal environment induces
a shift in outsourcing activity from South to North.26 T h ea s y m m e t r i ce ﬀects of the
change in γ come about, because the improved prospects for investment by input
suppliers mitigates the need for entry by ﬁnal-good producers. With the resources
freed from the activity of designing diﬀerentiated products, the North can expand its
outsourcing activities. Meanwhile, the improvements in contracting possibilities raise
world income (evaluated in terms of the numeraire good), and with it the demand for
homogeneous goods. More labor must be devoted in the South to producing these
goods, which means that less is available for serving the needs of ﬁnal producers.
26Outsourcing activity falls in the South, despite the increase in γS, because mS falls by a greater
percentage than output per ﬁrm rises.
385.3 Improvements in Contracting in the South
We are now ready to explain why improvements in the contracting environment in the
South, even if achieved from a very low initial level, need not result in an expansion
of outsourcing activity there. We take an initial situation with γN > γS =0and
consider a marginal increase in γS.
For reasons that are familiar by now, an increase in γS raises (at given ω, mS
and mN) the relative proﬁtability of search in the South. To restore the equal-proﬁt
relationship, the function ω(mS,m N) must shift down. The movement in the relative
wage (or the terms of trade) expands the demand for diﬀerentiated goods by the
South, and reduces the demand for homogeneous goods by the North. Thus, the shift
in ω(mS,m N) exerts rightward pressure on the SS curve and downward pressure on
the NN curve, both of which tend to generate an expansion of outsourcing activity
in the South and a contraction of such activity in the North.
But the eﬀe c t so ft h ec h a n g ei nr e l a t i v ep r o ﬁtability are oﬀset by impacts on labor
demand at the initial pattern of search activity. In the South, component producers
are able to serve more customers, and so their demand for labor grows for both
investment and production purposes. This alone would shift the SS curve to the
left. At the same time, the intensiﬁed competition in the product market that results
from the broader search eﬀorts of ﬁrms seeking partners in the South spells the exit
of some ﬁnal producers in the North. This alone reduces labor demand, tending to
push the NN curve upward. On net, the SS curve can shift in either direction, as
can the NN curve.
Again, we resorted to numerical computations to see what outcomes are possible.
Taking search costs to be small and holding γN ﬁxed at γN =0 .4,w ev a r i e dγS from
0 to 0.4 for a wide range of values of the remaining parameters. Repeatedly, we found
that the volume of outsourcing in the North rises monotonically with γS, while the
volume of outsourcing in the South rises at ﬁrst, but then falls to a level below that for
γS =0 .27 So too does the ratio of world trade to world income and the share of intra-
27If search costs are not so small, improvements in the contracting environment in the South may
lead to a decline in international outsourcing for all initial values of γS. Take, for example, the
39industry trade in total trade. In other words, the volume of international outsourcing
and the volume of world trade typically are largest when the legal environment allows
somewhat less complete contracts in the South than in the North.28
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have developed a framework for studying outsourcing decisions in a global econ-
omy. In our model, producers of diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods must go outside the ﬁrm
for an essential service or component. Search is costly and ﬁrms choose whether to
conduct it in one national market or the another. If a ﬁrm ﬁnds a potential partner
with suitable expertise, the supplier must customize the input for the ﬁnal producer’s
use. Such relationship-speciﬁc investments are governed by incomplete contracts, and
the contracting environment may vary across national markets.
Our model features a thick-market externality: search in a market is more prof-
itable the more suppliers are present there, while input producers fare best when
they have many customers to serve. This externality creates the possibility of multi-
ple equilibria, some of which may involve a concentration of outsourcing activity in
one location. But stable equilibria need not involve complete specialization of input
production in a single country. In the paper, we focus on equilibria in which some
ﬁrms outsource at home while others ﬁll their input needs abroad.
First, we studied how country size and the technologies for search and investment
aﬀect the equilibrium location of outsourcing activity. As the South expands, its
share of world outsourcing grows, as does the ratio of trade to world income and the
share of intra-industry trade in total world trade. A uniform worldwide improvement
in search and investment technologies, as might result from technological progress
in communications and computer-aided design, has no aﬀe c to nt h ev o l u m eo fo u t -
parameter values that underlie Figure 4 and suppose that γN =0 .2.Then, as γS rises from 0 to
0.1, there is a monotonic decline in outsourcing activ i t yi nt h eS o u t ha n da ni n c r e a s ei no u t s o u r c i n g
activity in the North.
28These patterns obtain, for example, when when ηN = ηS =0 , µN = µS =5 0 , α =0 .5, β =0 .75,
fN
m = fS
m =0 .01, LN =4 0and LS =3 2 .
40sourcing or its international composition. But a disproportionate improvement in the
search or investment technology of the South spells a shift in outsourcing activity
from North to South.
N e x t ,w ei n v e s t i g a t e dt h er o l eo ft h ec o n t r a c t i n ge n v i r o n m e n t .W ec h a r a c t e r i z e d
the legal setting in a country by the fraction of a relationship-speciﬁci n v e s t m e n t
that is veriﬁable to a third party. An improvement in the contracting possibilities
in a country raises the relative proﬁtability of outsourcing there, given the numbers
of component producers in each country and the relative wage. But changes in the
contracting environment also aﬀect the demand for labor by component producers and
ﬁnal-good producers at a given wage. A global increase in the fraction of contractible
investment tends to favor outsourcing in the North, whereas an improvement in the
legal environment of the South can raise or lower the volume of outsourcing there
while raising outsourcing from the North.
Our model does not allow for in-house production of components by ﬁnal produc-
ers. Therefore, it cannot be used to study the make-or-buy decision that is a central
issue in the organization of a ﬁrm. In future research, we intend to enlarge the set
of opportunities open to a ﬁrm, and to study the four-way choice between domestic
investment, foreign investment, local outsourcing, and international outsourcing.
417 Appendix A: Equilibrium Conditions
In this appendix we develop equilibrium conditions for regimes with outsourcing in
both countries and assured matching in neither. Thus, we examine cases in which
both countries have costly search, both have a binding investment constraint, and one
has costly search and the other a binding investment constraint. We also consider
the existence of equilibria with all outsourcing activity concentrated in the North.
Throughout this appendix we assume that none of the relationship-speciﬁci n v e s t m e n t
is veriﬁable; i.e., γN = γS =0 .
7.1 Outsourcing in Both Countries
We begin with the labor-market clearing condition in the South. In Section 3.1
we showed that, if the investment constraint binds in the South, the number of














When the investment constraint does not bind in the South and ﬁnal producers
ﬁnd themselves in a regime of costly search, the optimal search intensity is rS =
mSSS/2wNηS. Substituting this expression, together with the output equation (7)

















This equation replaces (A1) as the Southern labor-market clearing condition in a
regime with costly search in the South.
Now we turn to the labor market in the North. We have seen that when the
investment constraint binds on ﬁnal producers seeking a partner at home, then rN =
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42When, instead, there is a regime of costly search in the North, the optimal search
intensity is given by rN = mNSN/2wNηN. Substituting this expression, together























Finally, we consider the requirement that, with outsourcing in both countries,
search must be equally proﬁtable in both places. If the investment constraint binds


















,( A 5 )
as we have seen before. If the investment constraint binds in the South but ﬁnal
producers are in a regime of costly search in the North, then rS = SS/2wSµS and
rN = mNSN/2wNηN. These expressions for the search intensities, together with the
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If the investment constraint binds for search in the North but not in the South, then












2ηS .( A 7 )
Finally, if ﬁnal producers are in a regime of costly search in both countries, then
ri = miSi/2wNηi for i = S,N. This, together with the free-entry conditions (19)






ηN .( A 8 )
Now we can derive the reduced-form SS and NN curves that apply for each
combination of regimes. First, we take the appropriate equal-proﬁt condition to
derive the relative wage that is consistent with equal proﬁtability given the numbers
of component producers in each country. This gives the function ω(mS,m N) for the
43particular regime combination. We then substitute this function into (A1) if the
investment constraint binds in the South, or into (A2) if the South has a regime of
costly search. This generates the SS curve. Similarly, we substitute the applicable
form of ω(mS,m N) into either (A3) or (A4) to derive the NN curve, depending upon
whether the North has a binding investment constraint or a regime of costly search.
Finally, we use (15) to derive the boundaries between the various combinations of
regimes.
We applied this procedure for the particular parameter values indicated in the
text to draw the SS and NN curves that are represented in Figures 4 and 5.
7.2 Outsourcing in the North only
We now consider the conditions for an equilibrium with outsourcing only in the North,
with production of homogeneous goods only in the South, and with a binding invest-
ment constraint that limits search by ﬁnal producers.29 In such an equilibrium, there
is no entry by component producers in the South, and no search by ﬁnal-good pro-
ducers for potential partners there.
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Thus, for the existence of an equilibrium of this type with wN >w S,w en e e dt h a t
βLS/(1 − β)LN > 1. In the North, the assumption of a binding investment con-
straint implies the labor-market clearing condition (20). Substituting (A9) into this






















29There might be other types of equilibria that we do not consider here. For example, outsourcing
may be concentrated in the South, or homogeneous goods may be produced in both locations. In
















The expression that appears in the square brackets in both (A11) and (A12) must
be positive for the existence of such an equilibrium; but this is guaranteed by the
requirements for a binding investment constraint (see (15)). It follows that these
conditions, together with the requirement that βLS/(1 − β)LN > 1, are suﬃcient
for the existence of an equilibrium with outsourcing concentrated in the North and
ω > 1. Such an equilibrium exists, for example, for the parameter values used to
draw Figures 4 and 5.
8 Appendix B: Stability
In this appendix, we consider the stability of equilibria with outsourcing in both
countries and search limited by a binding investment constraint in both the North
and the South. We also consider the stability of equilibria with outsourcing only in
the North and a binding investment constraint there. The stability conditions for
other combinations of regimes can be derived with similar methods.
Our procedure for conducting the stability analysis is as follows. First, we cal-
culate a “temporary” equilibrium for a given number of ﬁnal-good producers and
given numbers of component producers in each country. This temporary equilibrium
involves optimal search behavior by ﬁnal producers given the numbers of ﬁrms and
requires that both labor markets and all product markets clear. The temporary equi-
librium implies levels of net proﬁts (operating proﬁts less entry costs) for each type
of ﬁrm. We assume that the numbers of ﬁrms adjust over time, with positive proﬁts
inducing entry and negative proﬁts inducing exit. For the purposes of this appen-
dix, we take γi =0for i = S,N and treat the numbers of component producers as
continuous variables.
More formally, our procedure is to calculate functions ˆ Πn(n,mS,m N), ˆ ΠS
m(n,mS,m N)
and ˆ ΠN
m(n,mS,m N),w h e r eˆ Πn(·) is the expected proﬁt for a typical ﬁnal-good pro-
ducer net of ﬁxed costs when there is a measure n of ﬁnal-good producers in the North
45and mi component producers in country i,a n dˆ Πi
m(·) is the net proﬁto fat y p i c a l
component producer in country i under the same conditions. We measure ˆ Πi
m (·) in
units of the labor of country i and ˆ Πn(·) in units of Northern labor. We then assume
that the numbers of the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms adjust according to






















m are arbitrary positive constants. An equilibrium is a triplet
¡
n,mS,m N¢
that implies zero net proﬁts for ﬁnal producers, zero net proﬁts for
component producers in country i if mi > 0, and zero or negative net proﬁts for
component producers in country i if mi =0 . We consider such an equilibrium to be
(locally) stable if and only if the adjustment process represented by (B1) and (B2) is





8.1 Stability of Equilibria with a Binding Investment Con-
straint in Both Countries
We consider ﬁrst the stability of equilibria such as those depicted in Figure 4. For
an equilibrium to be locally stable for all adjustment speeds, the system comprising




m as λn → +∞.
To derive necessary conditions for stability, we focus on the extreme case with very
fast adjustment in the number of ﬁnal producers (λn → +∞). In this case n ad-
justs instantaneously to the numbers of component producers mS and mN,a n d
ˆ Πn[n(mS,m N),m S,m N]=0in the temporary equilibrium.
For the limiting case with λn → +∞, the stability analysis can be conducted with
the two equations that result from substituting n(mS,m N) for n in equation (B2).















46where Πi(mS,m N) ≡ ˆ Πi
m[n(mS,m N),m S,m N].
First, we need an expression for the proﬁt levels for component producers in a
temporary equilibrium. These proﬁts are the diﬀerence between operating proﬁts and










m for i = N,S.( B 4 )
We can use (B4), together with the zero-proﬁt condition for ﬁnal-good producers (19)
and the equal-proﬁt condition (21) to derive the labor-market clearing conditions in







































is demand for Southern labor when all proﬁts are zero; i.e., the left-hand side of (18).
The new terms in (B5) represent the demand for Southern labor that results from
the proﬁt income in each country.
To derive a reduced-form equation for labor-market clearing in the North, we
































Substituting this equation, (16) and (B4) into (14) yields the new labor-market clear-



































The numerator in this expression is the fraction β of total world income, including the proﬁts or


























is demand for Northern labor when all proﬁts are zero (i.e., the left-hand side of (20)).
The labor-market clearing conditions (B5) and (B6) can be used to solve for the












































































(1 − α)β (1 − β) > 0 .
Finally, we are ready to examine the stability of system (B3) at an equilibrium
point, say (˜ mS, ˜ mN),a tw h i c hΠS ¡
˜ mS, ˜ mN¢
=0and ΠN ¡
˜ mS, ˜ mN¢
=0 , and thus
Di(˜ mS, ˜ mN)=Li for i = S,N. Stability requires ΠS
S < 0,ΠN





S ,w h e r eΠi
j = ∂Πi(mS,m N)/∂mj.S i n c eDi
j > 0 for i 6= j, it follows from (B7)
that ΠS
S < 0 requires DS
S > 0. Similarly, it follows from (B8) that ΠN
N < 0 requires
DN
N > 0. Therefore, both the SS curve (deﬁned by DS ¡
mS,m N¢
= LS)a n dt h eNN
curve (deﬁned by DN ¡
mS,m N¢









S ,w h i c hi nt u r nr e q u i r e s
that the SS curve be steeper than the NN curve at a stable point of intersection.
We conclude that point E2 in Figure 4 is not a stable equilibrium point.
488.2 Stability of Equilibria with a Binding Investment Con-
straint in the North and Costly Search in the South
In this case, the equal-proﬁt condition is given by (A7). We use it to solve for
t h er e l a t i v ew a g ef u n c t i o nω
¡
mS,m N¢
. Since we assume that ﬁnal-good producers
enter and exit very rapidly in response to proﬁt opportunities, we have Πn =0at
every moment in time, which implies that (19) holds also at every moment in time.
Therefore, the labor-market-clearing condition for the North is the same as in (B6),
except that the relative wage function now is derived from (A7).
For the South, we need to derive a new labor-market-clearing condition that ac-


















S .( 1 3 0)
Now, using the expression for the proﬁts of intermediate-good producers given in
(B4), together with the facts that yS = αSS/(1 − α)wS and that the equilibrium




























































is the one derived from (A7).
The labor-market-clearing conditions (B50)a n d( B 6 )c a nb eu s e dt os o l v ef o rt h e
































































































(1 − α)β (1 − β).
Note that Γ0 > 0, because the term in the ﬁrst square bracket is larger than 1 − β
and so its product with 1
2 (1 − α)β is larger in absolute value than the negative term.
Finally, we are ready to examine the stability of system (B3) at an equilibrium
point, say (˜ mS, ˜ mN),a tw h i c hΠS ¡
˜ mS, ˜ mN¢
=0and ΠN ¡
˜ mS, ˜ mN¢
=0 , and thus
Di(˜ mS, ˜ mN)=Li for i = S,N. Stability requires ΠS
S < 0, ΠN





S ,w h e r eΠi











S > 0, it follows from (B70)t h a tΠS
S < 0 requires DS
S > 0.T h e r ea r en o w
two possibilities: either DS
N ≥ 0 or DS
N < 0.I f DS
N ≥ 0, it follows from (B80)t h a t
ΠN
N < 0 requires DN





S requires that the SS curve is the steeper of the two. This is
similar to what we found in the previous section.
Alternatively, if DS
N < 0,t h eSS curve slopes upward, because DS
S > 0 at a stable
equilibrium. Now ΠN
N < 0 does not imply that DN
N > 0.I fi th a p p e n st h a tDN
N > 0,





be violated. Thus, an equilibrium at which the NN curve slopes downward and the
SS curve slopes upward — such as the one depicted by point E2 in Figure 5 — is not
stable. The only remaining possibility is that DN
N < 0,i nw h i c hc a s eb o t ht h eNN





that the NN curve must be the steeper. We have not been able to rule out the
existence of a stable equilibrium of this sort, but nor have we been able to construct
one in our numerical simulations.
508.3 Stability of Equilibria with Outsourcing Concentrated in
the North
We examine next the stability of an equilibrium in which all intermediate goods are
produced in the North and a binding investment constraint limits the search of ﬁnal
producers there. The conditions for such an equilibrium were derived in Appendix
A.
When mS is close to zero, no ﬁnal-good producer searches for an outsourcing
partner in the South. With nS =0 , the operating proﬁts of a Southern component
producer are zero, and the total proﬁts are negative; see (B4) with i = S. It follows
that if a small number of Southern component producers do happen to be in the
market, they will gradually exit according to the dynamics given in (B2).
The proﬁts of Northern component producers are given by (B4) with i = N.T h e
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In the South, the labor-market clearing condition in a temporary equilibrium becomes
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N.( B 1 1 )
Now we can use (B4), (B9), (B10), (B11) and ΠS = −fS
m to solve for the expected
proﬁts of ﬁnal-good producers and the proﬁts of the typical Northern component


















































































1 − α2 − 2
¶
m
N > 0 .
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for stability are ∂Πn/∂n<0, ∂ΠN/∂mN <
0,a n d(∂Πn/∂n)(∂ΠN/∂mN) >
¡
∂Πn/∂mN¢
(∂ΠN/∂n). At an equilibrium point
with mN =( 1− α)LN/4fN




m/fn, these conditions are
satisﬁed. Therefore, when there exists an equilibrium with outsourcing concentrated
in the North and a binding investment constraint, that equilibrium is stable.
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